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Lewis v. Commonwealth
593 S.E.2d 220 (Va. 2004)
I. Facts
Before dawn on October 30, 2002, Matthew J. Shallenberger and Rodney
L. Fuller, both bearing shotguns, entered the Danville mobile home of Julian
Clifton Lewis ("Julian' and his wife Teresa Wilson Bean Lewis ("Lewis")
through an unlocked back door. Shallenberger told Lewis, "Teresa, get up," and
Lewis went into the kitchen. Shallenberger shot Julian several times while Fuller
entered the room of CharlesJ. Lewis ("Charles"), Lewis's adult stepson, and shot
him three times. Lewis returned to her bedroom to collect her husband's pants
and wallet as he lay fatally wounded. Fuller entered the kitchen, where
Shallenberger and Lewis stood counting the contents of the wallet, and declared
that Charles "wouldn't die." Fuller retrieved Shallenberger's gun, returned to
Charles's room, and shot him twice more. Fuller and Shallenberger collected the
spent shells, split the money Lewis had taken from the wallet, and left the mobile
home.
At approximately 3:55 a.m., forty-five minutes after the shootings, Lewis
phoned Pittsylvania County emergency services to report that a man had entered
her home and shot her husband and his son. Twenty-three minutes later, sher-
iff's deputies arrived to discover Charles dead and Julian moaning in the bed-
room. Julian died of blood loss after telling the officers, "[m]y wife knows who
done this to me."
2
Although Lewis initially denied any involvement in the murders, on Novem-
ber 7, 2002, she confessed to police that she had offered to pay Shallenberger to
kill her husband and that she had let him into the mobile home, where he shot
both Julian and Charles.3 The next day, Lewis told police that Fuller and Lewis's
own sixteen year-old daughter Christie Bean had also been involved in the
murders. Lewis met Shallenberger and Fuller at a Danville retail store in the
autumn of 2002. Soon thereafter, Lewis and Shallenberger developed a plan to
killJulian and divide the proceeds from his life insurance policy. To facilitate this
plan, Lewis provided the two men with $1,200 to purchase weapons and ammu-
1. Lewis v. Commonwealth, 593 S.E.2d 220, 222-23 (Va. 2004).
2. Id. at 223-24.
3. Id at 224. Lewis was the primary beneficiary on Julian's life insurance policy and the
secondary beneficiary on Charles's will and life insurance policy. Id. at 222. On the day of the
murder, Lewis called Julian's employer to ask him for her husband's paycheck and sought informa-
tion from Charles's commanding officer about Charles's life insurance policy. Id at 224. Charles
was in the Army Reserves and on October 30 had been visiting his family before reporting to active
duty with the National Guard in Maryland. Id at 222-23.
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nition. The initial plan provided that Shallenberger and Fuller would kill Julian
on his way home from work and make it look like a robbery. After the first plan
failed, they decided to kill Julian in his home and then kill his son Charles while
he was home for his father's funeral. When Charles unexpectedly came home
before October 30, they amended the plan a final time and succeeded in killing
both Julian and Charles on the same morning.4
A grand jury indicted Lewis on November 20, 2002, for seven offenses,
including the capital murders for hire of Charles and Julian Lewis, conspiracy to
commit capital murder, robbery, use of a firearm to commit murder, and use of
a firearm to commit robbery.' Lewis pleaded guilty to all of the charges, and the
circuit court found, after a competency evaluation, that she did so "voluntarily,
intelligently, and knowingly."6 After considering a summary of the Common-
wealth's evidence and the presentence report, the circuit court found that Lewis's
"conduct was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman" in that it
involved both aggravated battery and depravity of mind.7 The circuit court
sentenced her to death for both capital murder charges
In her appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia, Lewis argued that her death
sentences were excessive and disproportionate in comparison with similar cases.
She also argued that the circuit court erred in finding that her actions satisfied the
vileness aggravator required for death eligibility by Virginia Code section 19.2-
264.2, the court sentenced her to death "under the influence of passion, prejudice
and other arbitrary factors," and the court erred in denying her motion to declare
unconstitutional Virginia's death penalty statute.9 Finally, she claimed that the
4. Id at 222-24.
5. Id at 221; see VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31(2) (Michie 2004) (stating that "[t]he willful,
deliberate, and premeditated killing of any person by another for hire" constitutes capital murder);
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-22 (Michie 2004) (stating that conspiracy to commit a felony is itself a
felony); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-58 (Michie 2004) (stating that "robbery... by other violence to the
person" is a felony punishable by imprisonment for life); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-53.1 (Michie 2004)
(making it "unlawful for any person to use ... [a] firearm .. . in a threatening manner while
committing... murder").
6. Leaws, 593 S.E.2d at 221. Dr. Barbara G. Haskins, the psychiatrist who found Lewis
competent to stand trial, noted that Lewis had a Full Scale I.Q. of 72, placing her within the
"borderline range of mental retardation." Id
7. Id at 222; See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-299(A) (Michie 2004) (requiring a court, "when the
defendant pleads guilty without a plea agreement," to "direct a probation officer... to thoroughly
investigate and report upon the history of the accused... to fully advise the court so the court may
determine the appropriate sentence to be imposed'); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (Michie 2004)
(defining the aggravating factors that must be proven in order for a person convicted of capital
murder to be eligible for a death sentence). In the postsentencing hearing, the circuit court
concluded that the triggermen, Shallenberger and Fuller, had committed aggravated battery upon
the victims and imputed that battery to Lewis, although she took no part in the actual slayings.
Lewis, 593 S.E.2d at 222.
8. Lewis, 593 S.E.2d at 222.
9. Id at 228-29.
230 [Vol. 17:1
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court erred in sentencing her to death because the indictments "omitted essential
aggravating elements."'"
II. Holding
In denying Lewis's appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that because
of the "special heinousness associated with the murder for hire in this particular
case," the death sentences were neither excessive nor disproportionate." The
court did not decide whether the circuit court erred in imputing to Lewis the
aggravated battery by the triggermen because it concluded that the circuit court
had ample evidence to determine that Lewis's own conduct in the scheme
demonstrated her depravity of mind and thus satisfied the vileness aggravator.)
2
In addition, the court found no evidence in the record to support Lewis's
argument that the sentencing court was influenced by passion or prejudice.' 3 The
court also held that by pleading guilty to the charges, Lewis waived her arguments
concerning the constitutionality of Virginia's death penalty statute. 4 Finally, the
court found that Lewis had procedurally defaulted her claim concerning the





Lewis first argued that her death sentence was "excessive and disproportion-
ate" in comparison to similar cases involving female defendants with no violent
criminal history and who accepted responsibility for their crimes.'6 Without
addressing Lewis's points about her history and remorse, the Supreme Court of
10. Id at 225-28; see VA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-313(C)(2) (Michie 2003) (requiring that the
Supreme Court of Virginia evaluate if a sentence of death "is excessive or disproportionate to the
penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant"); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 19.2-264.2 (stating that "a sentence of death shall not be imposed unless the court or jury shall
... find... that [the defendant's] conduct in committing the offense for which [she] stands charged
was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind
or an aggravated battery to the victim"); VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-313(C) (1) (stating that the Supreme
Court of Virginia must decide if a lower court imposed a death sentence "under the influence of
passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor").
11. Lewis, 593 S.E.2d at 226-27.
12. Id at 227-28.
13. Id at 228.
14. Id
15. Id at 228-29; see VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:25 (disallowing claims of error that were not "stated
with reasonable certainty at the time of the ruling").
16. Lews, 593 S.E.2d at 225.
2004]
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Virginia stated that it could not consider Lewis's gender in its proportionality
review because "[a]ll criminal statutes in this Commonwealth must be applied
without regard to gender.' 17 Interpreting Lewis's claim as an invitation "to apply
Virginia's capital murder statutes in a discriminatory fashion based upon gender,"
the court rejected it.'
2. Capital Murderfor Hire
Lewis next argued that her sentence was "excessive and disproportionate"
because she merely employed the men who killed Julian and Charles. 9 She
further argued that the Supreme Court of Virginia had never upheld a death
sentence in a murder for hire case in which vileness was the sole aggravator. °
The court responded by outlining the general rule for proportionality review, as
stated in Virginia Code section 17.1-313(C)(2), that "the court shall consider and
determine... [w]hether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate
to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the
defendant.",2' Referring to its earlier decisions, the court explained the test as
whether " 'juries in this jurisdiction generally approve the supreme penalty for
comparable or similar crimes.' "2 The court emphasized that it does not inquire
"why the trier of fact imposed the sentence of life instead of the sentence of
death," but instead looks to the cases that " 'justify the imposition of the death
penalty.' )23 In its search to "identify and invalidate the aberrant sentence of
death," the Supreme Court of Virginia examined similar capital murder for hire
cases in which the defendant received the death penalty and held "that given the
special heinousness... in this particular case, emphasizing that the defendant
was the mastermind of the plan to kill her husband and stepson solely for greed
and monetary gain, the sentences of death are neither excessive nor dispropor-
tionate.
24
3. Life Sentences for the Triggermen
Lewis's final proportionality argument rested on the fact that both of her
co-defendants received life sentences, despite their more direct involvement in




21. VA. CODE ANN. § 17.2-313(C)(2) (Michie 2003).
22. Lewis, 593 S.E.2d at 226 (quoting Wolfe v. Commonwealth, 576 S.E.2d 471, 490 (Va.
2003)).
23. Id (quoting Orbe v. Commonwealth, 519 S.E.2d 808,817 (Va. 1999)).
24. Id. (citing Voe, 576 S.E.2d at 471; Williams v. Commonwealth, 472 S.E.2d 50, 54 (Va.
1996); Murphy v. Commonwealth, 431 S.E.2d 48, 55 (Va. 1993); Fisher v. Commonwealth, 374
S.E.2d 46, 55 (Va. 1988); Stockton v. Commonwealth, 314 S.E.2d 371, 389 (Va. 1984); Clark v.
Commonwealth, 257 S.E.2d 784, 794 (Va. 1979)).
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the killings.25 The court refused to make a proportionality comparison among
the sentences of co-defendants, stating that it" 'ha[s] rejected efforts by defen-
dants to compare their sentences with those received by confederates.' 26





Lewis next claimed that the circuit court erred in finding the vileness
element by imputing to her the aggravated batteries committed by Shallenberger
and Fuller.' She argued that because she did not participate in the actual mur-
ders, she committed no aggravated battery.29 The Supreme Court of Virginia
noted that Virginia Code section 19.2-264.2 provides that vileness can be demon-
strated by " 'torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the vic-
tim.' "' The court then cited its decision in Beck v. Commonwealt3  for the
proposition that" '[p]roof of any one of these three components will support a
finding of vileness.' 32 The court clarified this position in Hedrick v. Common-
wealth,33 when it stated that " 'the term "vileness" includes three separate and
distinct factors, with the proof of any one factor being sufficient to support a
finding of vileness.' "' The court stated that it did not need to decide the
aggravated battery issue raised by Lewis because Lewis's conduct demonstrated
depravity of mind.3" The court, therefore, relied on the circuit court's finding of
depravity of mind to sustain the death sentence.
36
25. Id at 226-27.
26. Id at 227 (quoting Mupy, 431 S.E.2d at 53). In support of its refusal to consider the
sentences of Lewis's co-defendants, the court also cited Thomas v. Commonwealth, 419 S.E.2d 606,
620 (Va. 1992); King v. Commonwealth, 416 S.E.2d 669,679 (Va. 1992); Evans v. Commonwealth,
284 S.E.2d 816, 823 (Va. 1981). Id
27. Id
28. Lewis, 593 S.E.2d at 227.
29. Id
30. Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (Michie 2004)).
31. 484 S.E.2d 898 (Va. 1997).
32. Lewis, 593 S.E.2d at 227 (quoting Beck v. Commonwealth, 484 S.E.2d 898, 907 (Va.
1997)).
33. 513 S.E.2d 634 (Va. 1999).






2. Depraiy of Mind
Lewis also argued that the circuit court erroneously found that her actions
demonstrated depravity of mind.37 The Supreme Court of Virginia conclusively
rejected this argument, stating that "the evidence of record is overwhelming that
the defendant's conduct showed a depravity of mind."3 The court provided
specific examples of Lewis's conduct relevant to the depravity of mind issue. 9
In particular, the court noted that Lewis was the mastermind of the crimes, that
she married and had her husband killed solely for money, that she involved her
adolescent daughter in the scheme, that she allowed her husband to lie suffering
before calling for help, and that she "showed no emotion or remorse" after his
death.' The court found the family relationship to be significant evidence of
depravity and stated that "but for the conduct of this defendant... the killings
would not have occurred."'" The court therefore held that the evidence was
sufficient to support the circuit court's finding of vileness based on depravity of
mind.42
C Passion, Prejudice, or Otber Arbitragy Factors
Lewis's next claim was that the circuit court imposed the death penalty
"under the influence of passion, prejudice, and other arbitrary factors."'43 Lewis
argued that her death sentence could not stand because the judge who sentenced
her to death sentenced her confederates to life, despite the fact that as the
triggermen they were more "directly culpable in the slayings." She claimed,
therefore, that the vileness of the crime should have been applied to all three
perpetrators or applied to none at all.4 ' Notwithstanding this argument, the court




39. Id. at 228.
40. Lewis, 593 S.E.2d at 228.
41. Id
42. Id
43. Id; see VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-313(C)(1) (Michie 2003) (requiring the Supreme Court of
Virginia to determine whether a death sentence was imposed "under the influence of passion,
prejudice or any other arbitrary factor").





D. Proceduraly Defaulted Claims
1. ConstitutionalArgument
Lewis argued that the circuit court erred in denying her motion challenging
the constitutionality of Virginia's death penalty statutes.4 ' The Supreme Court
of Virginia refused to consider Lewis's arguments because she pleaded guilty to
the offenses." Relying on several of its past decisions, the court held that by
entering a plea of guilty, Lewis waived her constitutional arguments.4
2. Faulty Indictments
Lewis concluded her appeal with an argument that the death sentence
should not stand because the indictments "omitted essential aggravating ele-
ments."-' ° The court, in accordance with Virginia Supreme Court Rule 5:25,
stated that the "[d]efendant failed to assert this argument in the circuit court and,
therefore, she may not assert the argument on appeal."'" Therefore, because
Lewis did not raise an objection to the indictments in circuit court, she defaulted
this claim on direct appeal.5 2
IV. Application to Virginia Practice
A. Statutoy Review
1. Gender
The Lewis opinion provides a cautionary tale for defense attorneys who
might be tempted to rest their proportionality arguments on a category such as
gender. In her appeal, Lewis phrased her plea for a consideration of her person
solely in terms of her gender. 3 Although Virginia has not executed a woman
since 1912, and despite the understandable question of why Lewis's case should
be the one in which the Commonwealth has decided to break with tradition, her
gender argument allowed the court to sidestep a real comparison of Lewis with
similar defendants by asserting that it would not "apply Virginia's capital murder
statutes in a discriminatory fashion based upon gender."'5 Lewis had other
47. Id
48. Id
49. Id (citing Murphy, 431 S.E.2d at 51; Savino v. Commonwealth, 391 S.E.2d 276, 278 (Va.
1990); Stout v. Commonwealth, 376 S.E.2d 288, 291 (Va. 1989)).
50. Lewis, 593 S.E.2d at 228-29.
51. Id at 229 (citing VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:25).
52. Id
53. Id. at 225. Lewis's gender claim relied primarily on the statutory language of VA. CODE
ANN. § 17.1-313(C)(2) that the court must consider "both the crime and the defendant." Id
54. Id at 226; see Victor L. Strieb, Deatb Pena/yforFemak Offenders, Januaty 1, 1973, thrvugh June
30, 2003 (July 1,2003), avaiableathttp://www.law.onu.edu/faculty/streib/femdeath.htm (providing
2004]
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arguably valid proportionality claims, including her lack of violent criminal
history, the fact that she confessed to the crimes and led police to the actual
killers, and her borderline intellectual functioning."s The court, however, did not
consider any of this evidence in its review because it was presented within the
framework of an argument about gender.
2. Murderfor Hire
It is interesting to note that in reporting its review of similar crimes, the
Supreme Court of Virginia made no mention of the actual facts of any of the
comparison murder for hire cases and instead relied on the facts of Lewis's case
alone to uphold the death sentence.5 6 Lewis argued that "there is no reported
case in which this Court approved the death penalty for a 'mere hirer' due to the
vileness predicate alone."57 Indeed, the cases that the court cited include four
murders for hire in which the defendants were the actual killers and two in which
they were the hirers."8 All six defendants received death sentences based either
on future dangerousness alone or future dangerousness coupled with vileness."
The court acknowledged that there was little similarity among the cited murder
for hire cases and Lewis's by stating that "the facts in all capital murder cases
differ" and by upholding the sentence because of "the special heinousness
associated with the murder for hire in this particular case."'  Lewis seems to
stand for the proposition that if the crime is especially bad, then the court can
ignore its mandate to compare crimes and defendants and deny that a death
sentence is disproportionate without comparing it to an appropriate set of similar
cases.
3. The Tiggermen
The Supreme Court of Virginia's treatment of Lewis's argument that the
court should consider the sentences of her co-defendants in the proportionality
data on death sentences for female offenders throughout the United States).
55. Lewis, 593 S.E.2d at 221, 224-25.
56. Id at 226.
57. Id.
58. Id; see Wofe, 576 S.E.2d at 474-77, 490 (affirming the death sentence based on future
dangerousness for the defendant's hiring of the actual killer and being directly involved with the
slaying); Wilihams, 472 S.E.2d at 50-51 (affirming the death sentence based on future dangerousness
for the actual killer); Murphy, 431 S.E.2d at 52-53 (affirming the death sentence based on future
dangerousness and vileness for the actual killer); Fisher, 374 S.E.2d at 47-49, 55 (affirming the death
sentence based on future dangerousness for the hirer who was directly involved in the slaying);
Stockton, 314 S.E.2d at 385-86, 389 (affirming the death sentence based on future dangerousness
and vileness for the actual killer); Clark, 257 S.E.2d at 786-87 (affirming the death sentence for the
actual killer).




review raises additional questions. In dismissing Lewis's claim, the court relied
on its decisions in Muiphy v. Commonwealth,6 Thomas v. Commonwealth,62 King v.
Commonwealth,63 and Evans v. Commonwealth' for the proposition that it need not
consider the sentences of co-defendants.6" A close look at those cases, however,
reveals that the underlying rationale for the court's refusal to make a comparison
of the sentences of co-defendants has its roots in just such a comparison.
Without further explanation, Murphy simply cites Thomas, King, and Evans.66
Thomas cites King, Evans, Stamper v. Commonwealth,67 and Coppola v. Commonwealth.6"
Evans only cites Stamper and Coppola.69 King and Stamper both stand for the
proposition that the court does not need to compare the sentence of a defendant
with that of a co-defendant convicted of a lesser-included offense.7" In Stamper, the
court stated that, "[wie cannot fairly determine whether a death sentence is
excessive or disproportionate by comparing it with sentences imposed upon
convictions [of a confederate] for lesser included offenses, reached perhaps by
compromise verdicts, even where there may be similarities in the evidence."'"
The court made clear in King that a comparison of the sentences of co-defendants
convicted of different crimes "would amount to a comparison of apples and
oranges."7 2 A good portion, then, of the precedent on which the court in Lewis
relied was simply inapplicable to her case, because her confederates were indeed
convicted of the same, and not lesser-included, offenses.
In Coppola, the only applicable decision on which all of the Supreme Court
of Virginia's precedents stand, the court actually did compare the co-defendants
in its review of the death sentence.73 Frank Coppola ("Coppola"),Joseph Miltier,
Donna Mills, and Karen Coppola ("Karen") all participated in the murder and
61. 431 S.E.2d 48 (Va. 1993).
62. 419 S.E.2d 606 (Va. 1992).
63. 416 S.E.2d 669 (Va. 1992).
64. 284 S.E.2d 816 (Va. 1981).
65. Lewis, 593 S.E.2d at 227; see Murphy, 431 S.E.2d at 53-54 (refusing to consider the
sentences of co-defendants in proportionality review); Thomas, 419 S.E.2d at 620 (refusing to take
note of the sentences that Thomas's co-defendants received); King, 416 S.E.2d at 679 (finding that
a court need not compare the sentences of co-defendants who were convicted of lesser-included
offenses with the sentence of the defendant); Evans, 284 S.E.2d at 823 (relying on previous cases
for the court's refusal to compare the sentences of co-defendants).
66. Murpby, 431 S.E.2d at 53-54.
67. 257 S.E.2d 808 (Va. 1979).
68. Thomas, 419 S.E.2d at 620 (citing Stamper v. Commonwealth, 257 S.E.2d 808, 824 (Va.
1979); Coppola v. Commonwealth, 257 S.E.2d 797, 807 (Va. 1979)).
69. Evans, 284 S.E.2d at 823.
70. King, 416 S.E.2d at 679; Stamper, 257 S.E.2d at 824.
71. Stamper, 257 S.E.2d at 824.
72. King, 416 S.E.2d at 679.
73. Coppola, 257 S.E.2d at 807.
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robbery of Muriel Hatchell. 74 Miltier and Mills received life sentences, but the
jury sentenced Coppola to death."v In reviewing Coppola's sentence, the Su-
preme Court of Virginia distinguished Mills and Karen because they cooperated
with the Commonwealth in its investigation, stating, "[tiheir cooperation puts
them in a different category from... Coppola and diminishes the similarity of
the cases." 6 The court then compared Miltier's conduct with that of Coppola
and found that it was different enough to warrant a lesser sentence. 7 Coppola's
"conduct towards Mrs. Hatchell.. . culminating in her death," the court stated,
"appears... to have been more violent and vicious than that of Miltier, and thus
distinguishable."7  The court distinguished Miltier's conduct in reviewing
Coppola's sentence, thus undermining its present insistence that it does not
compare co-defendants. In short, the precedent upon which the Supreme Court
of Virginia ostensibly relied in refusing to compare Lewis's conduct and sentence
to those of her co-defendants actually has its basis in just such a comparison.
The court in Coppola only held that it was not required to commute a defendant's
death sentence simply because his co-defendant received life. 9 It was able to so
hold precisely because it compared the conduct of all of the confederates. Given
her level of cooperation with the police and her lack of violent conduct, Lewis
might have fared better had the court more faithfully applied Coppola.
Federal death penalty law suggests that a comparison of the sentences that
co-defendants receive is desirable, if not essential, when a court considers
imposing the death penalty. The Federal Death Penalty Act requires that the trier
of fact "shall" consider in mitigation whether "[a]nother defendant or defen-
dants, equally culpable in the crime, will not be punished by death."' Virginia's
own triggerman law, to which murder for hire is an exception, illustrates that the
state takes seriously the importance of the actual killer's actions when considering
a death sentence.8' Fairness demands intra-crime proportionality review, espe-
cially in a case such as Lewis's, in which the circuit court chose to impute the
aggravated battery committed by the triggermen to the hirer.' If it is true that
74. Id. at 800.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 807.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Coppola, 257 S.E.2d at 808.
80. 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a)(4) (2000); seealso 21 U.S.C. § 848(m)(8) (2000) (requiring that identical
mitigating factors must be considered in death penalty proceedings under the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act).
81. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-18 (Michie 2004) (stating that, except in cases of murder for
hire, terrorism, and continuing criminal enterprise, "an accessory before the fact or principal in the
second degree to a capital murder shall be indicted, tried, convicted and punished as though the
offense were murder in the first degree").
82. Lewis, 593 S.E.2d at 222, 227.
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"five Members of the Court have now expressly recognized that death is a
different kind of punishment from any other which may be imposed in this
country," as Justice Stevens observed in Gardner v. Florida,3 then state courts
should take more care to be sure that they reserve their death sentences for the
worst of the worst.' Intra-crime proportionality review would be a strong step
in the correct direction.
4. Passion and Prjudice
Lewis illustrates the superficiality of the Supreme Court of Virginia's statu-
tory review for the influence of passion or prejudice. Instead of addressing
Lewis's arguments about prejudice directly, the court dismissed them with a
reference to the record."3 Lewis's case involved a guilty plea, her confession led
directly to the arrests of the actual killers, and the same judge sentenced all three
participants."M The fact that the judge sentenced to death only the woman who
fired no shots should merit a more careful review for prejudicial influences.
B. Vileness
Despite the Supreme Court of Virginia's holding that Lewis's depravity of
mind was sufficient to satisfy the vileness aggravator and support her death
sentence, its decision not to address the circuit court's possible error in imputing
Shallengberger and Fuller's aggravated battery to Lewis raises a question about
the distinction between the finding that a defendant is death-eligible and the
decision to impose the death penalty. While either predicate-aggravated battery
or depravity of mind-would have permitted a finding of vileness, both may
have influenced the circuit court judge's ultimate decision to sentence Lewis to
death. The direct appeal opinion, however, does not assess how much each
predicate might have weighed in the actual sentencing decision. If the lower
court's imputation of aggravated battery was in error and if it weighed heavily in
the death decision, then depravity of mind alone might not have led the judge to
impose the sentence.
In Zant v. Stephens, 7 the United States Supreme Court upheld a death
sentence despite the fact that the Supreme Court of Georgia had invalidated as
unconstitutional one of the aggravating factors found by the jury.'M The Court
found that the jury had sufficient evidence to make the decision to impose a
83. 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
84. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 (1977).
85. Lewis, 593 S.E.2d at 228.
86. Id
87. 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
88. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 891 (1983).
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death sentence even if the prior conviction's aggravator was no longer valid. 9
In reversing the death sentence in Tuggle v. Netherland,9 by contrast, the Court
distinguished Zant.9" In Tuggle, the Court noted that Tuggle's original jury had
sentenced him to death on both the vileness and the future dangerousness
aggravators.9' The Commonwealth had presented psychological evidence of
Tuggle's future dangerousness, but Tuggle was not able to rebut that evidence
because he was denied the assistance of a defense psychiatric expert.93
After the Supreme Court of Virginia had affirmed Tuggle's conviction and
sentence on direct appeal, the Supreme Court decided in Ake v. Oklahoma4 that
a court must provide an indigent defendant with a psychiatric expert if the
prosecution relies on psychiatric evidence to assert future dangerousness.9 In
light of Ake, the Supreme Court of Virginia invalidated Tuggle's future danger-
ousness aggravator but upheld his death sentence because the jury had also found
vileness.96 In Tuggle, the United States Supreme Court emphasized that the
absence of psychiatric evidence called into question the validity of the choice to
impose death despite the jury's additional finding of vileness.97 The Court stated:
"[w]e may assume ... that petitioner's psychiatric evidence would not have
influenced the jury's determination concerning vileness. Nevertheless, the
absence of such evidence may well have affected the jury's ultimate decision,
based on all of the evidence before it, to sentence petitioner to death rather than
life imprisonment."" The Court in Tuggle made a clear demarcation between the
stages of death eligibility and death selection and emphasized that the evidence
used at the selection stage must be valid.9 By not considering whether the circuit
court erred in its aggravated battery determination, the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia may have violated Tuggle's distinction between the finding of a death-eligible
predicate and the actual imposition of the death sentence.
C. Procedural Default
Lewis's guilty plea forced her to waive essential arguments about the
constitutionality of Virginia's death penalty statutes, but her failure to object to
89, Id at 888-89.
90. 516 U.S. 10 (1995).
91. Tuggle v. Netherand, 516 U.S. 10, 14 (1995).
92. Id at 11-12.
93. Id.
94. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
95. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83-84 (1985).
96. Tuggk, 516 U.S. at 12.





the faulty indictment in the circuit court prevented her from challenging what
was arguably the clearest error in the imposition of her death sentence. Ring v.
Arizona ° requires that aggravating factors, because they increase the maximum
sentence to death, must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt as elements of the
crime of capital murder.'0 ' If Lewis pleaded guilty to an indictment that did not
include the elements of future dangerousness or vileness, then she pleaded guilty
to a crime that is not death eligible. A close examination of the indictments and
a timely objection could have provided her with a winning argument for a life
sentence.
V. Conclusion
Lewis highlights some of the dangers of a guilty plea in a capital case without
a sentence bargain. Because of Lewis's plea, she was unable to challenge the
Commonwealth's evidence in a way that might have made a difference in her
sentencing. The narrative of the crime came directly from the Commonwealth's
evidence, giving the judge little reason to consider a version more favorable to
a life sentence. The opinion did not mention mitigating evidence, although there
were strong indications that such evidence was available. 2 Perhaps the greatest
danger lay in Lewis's default of her strongest argument: she pleaded guilty to a
crime for which she, by law, could arguably not have received a death sentence.
By not objecting to the indictment in court, Lewis fell victim to Virginia Supreme
Court Rule 5:25 and lost her opportunity to challenge her death sentence in the
manner most likely to succeed.'
Tamara L. Graham
100. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
101. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).
102. Lewis's borderline I.Q. score undermines the conclusion that she could have been the
"mastermind" of the murder scheme, and her confession led police to the actual killers. See Lenis,
493 S.E.2d at 221 (noting Dr. Hasher's finding that Lewis was borderline mentally retarded).
103. Lewis, 593 S.E.2d at 229; see VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:25 (disallowing claims of error that were
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